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Abstract— The EU is currently struggling to 
implement coherent coexistence regulations on 
genetically modified (GM) and non-GM crops in all 
member states. While it stresses that any approach 
needs to be “proportionate to the aim of achieving 
coexistence”, very few studies have actually attempted to 
assess whether the proposed spatial ex ante coexistence 
regulations (SEACERs) satisfy this proportionality 
condition. In this article, we define proportionality as a 
functional relationship which is weakly increasing in the 
incentives for coexistence. We propose a spatial 
framework based on an existing landscape and 
introduce the new concept of shadow factor as a 
measure for the opportunity costs induced by 
SEACERs. This enables comparing the proportionality 
of (i) rigid SEACERs which are based on large isolation 
distances imposed on GM farmers versus (ii) flexible 
SEACERs based on pollen barrier agreements between 
neighboring farmers. Our theoretical and empirical 
findings argue for flexibility as rigid SEACERs violate 
the proportionality condition and, hence, are not 
consistent with the objectives of the EU. 
Keywords— policy analysis, GIS, shadow factor. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Europe is currently struggling to implement 
coherent coexistence regulations on genetically 
modified (GM) and non-GM crops in all EU member 
states. According to the European Commission’s (EC) 
guidelines, “Coexistence refers to the ability of 
farmers to make a practical choice between 
conventional, organic and GM crop production, in 
compliance with the legal obligations for labeling 
and/or purity standards. The adventitious presence of 
GMOs [genetically modified organisms] above the 
tolerance threshold set out in Community legislation 
triggers the need for a crop that was intended to be a 
non-GMO crop, to be labeled as containing GMOs. 
This could cause a loss of income, due to a lower 
market price of the crop or difficulties in selling it. 
[…] Coexistence is, therefore, concerned with the 
potential economic impact of the admixture of GM 
and non-GM crops [...]” [1]. Since the publication of 
these guidelines, some member states have developed, 
and others are still developing, a diversity of ex ante 
regulations and ex post liability rules on the 
coexistence of GM and non-GM crops [2]. 
  In this article, our attention is drawn to the first 
group of ex ante regulations, and more specifically to 
spatial  ex ante coexistence regulations (SEACERs). 
Our concern is that some of the proposed SEACERs 
may impose a severe burden on GM crop production 
and may not be proportional to farmers’ economic 
incentives for coexistence. The European Commission 
has clearly emphasized the proportionality condition 
of SEACERs in a recent Communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament: “[…] 
coexistence measures should not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to ensure that adventitious traces of 
GMOs stay below the labelling threshold […] in order 
to avoid any unnecessary burden for the operators 
concerned. While some member states have taken this 
advice into account, others have decided to propose or 
adopt measures that aim to reduce adventitious 
presence of GMOs below this level. In some cases, 
proposed measures, such as isolation distances 
between GM and non-GM fields, appear to entail 
greater efforts for GM crop growers than necessary, 
which raises questions about the proportionality of 
certain measures. […] Given that the majority of 
member states have not yet proposed technical field 
measures for coexistence, and that little practical 
experience is available, a full evaluation of such 
measures has not yet been possible. While the 
Commission recognizes the legitimate right to regulate 
the cultivation of GM crops in order to achieve 
coexistence, it stresses that any approach needs to be 
proportionate to the aim of achieving coexistence” [2, 
p. 6]. 
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  In this paper, we analyze whether the current 
proposed SEACERs satisfy the proportionality 
condition. This question is extremely important and 
timely for EU policy makers who are currently facing 
the challenge of implementing coherent coexistence 
regulations tailored to a heterogeneous landscape of 
European agriculture. Therefore, in spite of the vague 
definition provided by the EC, we first need to agree 
upon a workable definition for proportionality and to 
what it relates. The fact that GM products are 
perceived by some consumers as ‘weakly inferior’ in 
quality, relative to their non-GM counterparts, implies 
that the mere introduction of GM crops affects the 
costs of non-GM food because of costly identity 
preservation [3] and coexistence measures [4], with 
potential negative welfare effects for society [5]. Why 
would society want to invest in costly measures to 
allow alternative production systems to coexist? The 
only possible answer is that markets provide 
incentives for providing both identity preserved (IP) 
non-GM crops and weakly inferior GM crops in 
response to a differentiated demand for both 
alternatives [6]. The incentives for coexistence may 
vary among regions, farmers, and even fields, and can 
be split up in (i) capturing GM rents through the 
cultivation of cost-reducing GM technologies, and (ii) 
capturing  IP rents by ensuring the purity and 
preserving the identity of higher valued non-GM crops 
to serve the market for IP non-GM crops. In the 
remainder of this article, we simply call the latter IP 
crops, implicitly assuming that they are non-GM. Our 
three basic assumptions further in the article exclude 
the possibility of non-IP non-GM crops. 
  Demont and Devos [7] argue that “Coexistence is 
an issue only if both economic incentives ‘coexist’ in 
farming communities; if one incentive is lacking, 
strictly speaking there is no coexistence problem” (p. 
354). Hence, the economic incentives for coexistence 
represent the benefits from belonging to one of two 
alternative classes of farmers, which we label ‘GM’ 
versus ‘IP’. The farm level costs of coexistence 
represent all the costs (opportunity, transaction and 
operational) of the measures that need to be taken to 
ensure that the purity of farmers’ IP crops is preserved 
throughout the production process. In this paper, we 
focus on the field level opportunity costs for 
complying with SEACERs. We argue that, in order to 
achieve coexistence, farmers will have to sacrifice part 
of their rents (incentives) derived from coexistence. 
We then assess whether the resulting opportunity costs 
of coexistence are proportional to the “the aim of 
achieving coexistence” [2, p. 6], where we define 
proportionality very broadly as a functional 
relationship which is weakly increasing in both 
incentives for coexistence. 
  In scientific and regulatory communities spatial 
coexistence of GM and non-GM crops is often 
regarded as a technical challenge and the debate has 
been centered mainly on (i) preventive coexistence 
measures needed to keep the adventitious presence of 
GM material in non-GM products below established 
tolerance thresholds [8-16], (ii) the feasibility of and 
costs of implementing such measures [13,17-21], (iii) 
segregation costs and potential economic losses 
resulting from adventitiously co-mingled products 
[5,22,23], (iv) who should bear the costs of 
coexistence measures [24,25], and on (v) who should 
redress the incurred economic losses due to 
adventitious mixing [2].  
  Although these aspects are of fundamental 
importance when discussing coexistence strategies, 
there is still limited information on the economic 
impact of alternative coexistence regulations. Munro 
[26] develops a simple model to assess the spatial 
impact of GM crops and shows that coexistence may 
be impossible without strong regulation on planting 
patterns. However, as his model is built on a 
simplified rectangular-shaped spatial economy, it does 
not take into account the geographical influence of 
landscape, land fragmentation, and field configuration 
on the impact of GM crops. His model predicts that 
the feasibility of SEACERs depends in part on the size 
of the barrier which must be maintained in order to 
avoid cross-fertilization between GM and non-GM 
crops. However, the question whether the SEACERs 
currently proposed by the EC satisfy the 
proportionality condition has received limited 
attention in the literature [7,27]. SEACERs interact 
with the spatial configuration of fields in a landscape, 
and therefore any modeling attempt to forecast the 
impact of alternative SEACERs needs to incorporate a 
market as well as a spatial component. The latter 
components are interlinked; the market outcomes 
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depend on the spatial configuration of the landscape, 
which on its turn determines the market.  
  The problem of such dual models is that, in order 
to be informative, they require an extensive amount of 
spatial (GIS) and market data (farmer and market 
surveys) that is generally not available or extremely 
expensive to collect on a large scale. Moreover, the 
incentives for coexistence, and especially the IP rents, 
are largely unknown in ex ante and so far, no study 
has ever attempted to predict the evolution of the 
differentiated market of GM and IP crops in the EU. 
Therefore, in this article we focus on the spatial 
impact of SEACERs under exogenous market 
conditions to assess whether they satisfy the 
proportionality condition. In contrast with Munro [26], 
we will use a real geographical dataset to assess the 
influence of the spatial configuration of a landscape on 
the proportionality of alternative SEACERs. More 
specifically, we will use the area affected by 
SEACERs as a measure for the opportunity costs 
engendered by the coexistence of a theoretical GM 
crop with its non-GM counterpart. The article is 
organized as follows. After this introduction, in 
Section 2 we discuss the economics of SEACERs. In 
Section 3, we propose a spatial modeling framework, 
in Section 4 we present some results generated by the 
framework under a set of alternative scenarios, and 
Section 5 finally concludes. 
II. ECONOMICS OF SEACERS  
Most EU member states’ SEACERs include (i) 
minimal isolation distance requirements, implemented 
by 10 member states, in combination with or as an 
alternative to (ii) pollen barriers planted with non-GM 
crops of the same species between GM and non-GM 
fields, implemented by six member states [2]. 
Isolation distances are rules governing the minimum 
distance between GM and non-GM crop fields of the 
same species. If a farmer’s field is too close to a 
neighboring farmer’s non-GM field of a particular 
crop, the field has to be planted with other crops or the 
same crop species but with non-GM varieties. In this 
paper, we label such fields as GM-free. Hence, the 
difference between a non-GM and a GM-free field is 
that the latter is exempt from GM variety planting of a 
certain species, while the former is not. Pollen 
barriers, on the other hand, are coexistence measures 
that rely on field margins that are planted with non-
GM crops of the same species and of which the 
harvest will need to be labeled as ‘GM’. Pollen 
barriers serve as cross-fertilization zones between GM 
and non-GM varieties of the same crop and can be 
planted on donor or recipient fields; the specifics of 
the barriers can be negotiated between neighboring 
farmers [7]. Imposing measures on GM crop farmers 
only, i.e. complying with the newcomer principle [1], 
introduces rigidity in SEACERs, whereas leaving 
measures open for negotiation between farmers 
introduces flexibility. Hence, in our definition, pollen 
barriers are better-suited measures than isolation 
distances for building flexibility into coexistence 
regulations. 
  In this article, we polarize rigid versus flexible 
SEACERs to draw policy recommendations. Based on 
evidence from the literature, we compare large 
isolation distances assuming rigidity, i.e. the 
regulations are imposed on GM farmers regardless of 
local agreements between neighboring farmers, versus 
narrow pollen barriers assuming flexibility, i.e. 
regulations allow pollen barriers to be negotiated and 
planted by GM as well as non-GM farmers. More 
specifically, we assume that with regards to the 
civilian responsibility of undertaking the coexistence 
measures, the newcomer principle is strictly enforced 
by rigid SEACERs, while it is recommended but not 
enforced by flexible SEACERs (similar to the 
advisory speed limits in German traffic law). 
However, we assume that the newcomer principle 
applies to both SEACERs with regards to the financial 
responsibility of undertaking the coexistence measures 
and, hence, that GM farmers reimburse non-GM 
farmers if the latter undertake measures in order to 
ensure coexistence. Our framework in the remainder 
of the paper is built on three basic assumptions: (i) 
compliance, i.e. farmers comply with the proposed 
SEACERs, (ii) effectiveness, i.e. the proposed 
SEACERs are effective in minimizing cross-
fertilization and keeping the GM content of non-GM 
crops below the EU threshold of 0.9%, and (iii) the 
newcomer principle [1] holds, i.e. GM farmers will 
bear the costs of coexistence measures and 
compensate non-GM farmers for incurred losses of 
crop purity. 
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  It is interesting to note that these contrasting 
definitions and basic assumptions imply that GM-free 
zones can be interpreted as external halo-effects 
(regulatory protection) of non-GM crops as a 
consequence of compliance with rigid SEACERs (GM 
farmers have to avoid proximity to non-GM fields), 
while pollen barriers can be interpreted as external 
halo-effects (cross-fertilization) of GM crops under 
flexible SEACERs (both farmers coordinate in order 
to ensure coexistence). Alternatively and analogously 
to Munro’s [26, p. 3] formulation, we could interpret a 
GM-free field as the shadow of a non-GM field in the 
context of rigid SEACERs and a pollen barrier as the 
shadow of a GM field in the context of flexible 
SEACERs. In the remainder of this article, we will use 
the term shadow area to designate the area of GM-free 
fields (in the context of rigid SEACERs) or planted 
with pollen barriers (in the context of flexible 
SEACERs). As shadow areas induce opportunity costs 
which are assumed to be financially borne by GM 
farmers and amortized over their GM area, we 
introduce a new concept and define the shadow factor, 
αs, as the ratio of the shadow area, as, to the GM area, 
ag, i.e. αs = as / ag. The shadow factor provides an 
interface between spatial and market models and is a 
measure for the average opportunity costs borne by 
GM farmers per hectare of GM planting for achieving 
coexistence under rigid and flexible SEACERs and 
given market conditions. The shadow factor is a 
monotonically increasing function of field density. 
Increased field densities both raise the occurrence of 
spatial interactions in the landscape and expand the 
shadow area as. However, at the same time, they 
accelerate the rate of GM to GM-free conversion and 
reduce the GM area ag. The shadow factor can be used 
to assess the impact of alternative SEACERs in 
different landscapes under given market conditions. It 
summarizes the multiplicator effect of a landscape on 
market opportunity costs as a result of the interaction 
between SEACERs and the spatial configuration of the 
landscape. SEACERs which progressively drive GM 
crop production out of the landscape, for example, will 
yield large shadow factors as opportunity costs need to 
be amortized over a smaller GM area. 
In the case of rigid SEACERs, such as isolation 
distances imposed on GM crop farmers, we assume 
that a rational farmer who foregoes the GM rent on a 
GM-free field will try to compensate this loss by 
attempting to capture the IP rent. The resulting market 
opportunity costs per unit of shadow area, are cid = g – 
p, and hence are a trade-off between the GM rent g 
and the IP rent p, both expressed per unit of shadow 
area. The GM rent is calculated as the per-hectare cost 
reduction generated by the GM crop relative to the 
conventional one. The IP rent is calculated as the 
product of the yield of the non-GM crop, the price of 
the GM crop, and the price premium factor of IP crops 
relative to GM crops [27]. In our definition, IP crops 
are intended to be free of GM material, but may 
contain adventitious presence of GM genes. If the 
content of the latter is above the official EU threshold 
of 0.9%, they lose their IP label and have to be 
labelled and commercialized as ‘contains GM’. The 
average coexistence costs, Cid, borne by GM farmers 
per unit of GM area induced by complying with an 
isolation distance can be split up in a variable part, 
proportional to the shadow area, and a fixed part:  
) 1 ( , ) ( ) ( id s id
g
s
id t p g t p g
a
a
C + − = + − = α
where as represents the total shadow area, i.e. the total 
GM-free area of a particular crop, ag the total area of 
GM plantings, tid the transaction and operational costs, 
and αs the shadow factor induced by rigid SEACERs. 
  In the case of flexible SEACERs, we consider four 
practical solutions, depending on whether the pollen 
barrier is cultivated on the GM field (System 1) or on 
the non-GM field (System 2) and whether it is planted, 
cultivated and/or harvested by the owner (System a) or 
the neighbor (System b) of the field. While the 
placement of the pollen barrier (System 1 versus 
System 2) determines the magnitude of the 
opportunity costs, the transaction and operational costs 
may vary among the four systems and also among 
regions, farmers and fields. In System 1a, the GM 
farmer plants and cultivates a pollen barrier with non-
GM crops on his GM field next to his neighbor’s non-
GM field. However, in the context of herbicide 
tolerant (HT) crops, maintaining two different weed 
control systems on a single field may not be practical 
for organizational reasons. Therefore, in System 1b it 
is the non-GM farmer who plants and cultivates a 
pollen barrier on the GM farmer’s field. The latter 
reimburses part of the former’s cultivation costs 
(sowing and herbicide treatments), harvests his entire 
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field, including the pollen barrier, and sells his crops 
as GM. In either version of System 1, the GM farmer 
foregoes the GM rent g on his pollen barrier. In 
System 2a, the non-GM farmer separately harvests his 
adjacent margins, which serve as pollen barriers, next 
to the neighboring farmer’s GM fields, and delivers 
them to the collector as ‘GM’. However, he foregoes 
any scale economies of harvesting and selling his full 
non-GM crop production in a single lot, such as in 
System 1b. Therefore, a variant which takes advantage 
of scale economies is System 2b: the GM farmer first 
harvests the field margin on the non-GM farmer’s 
field (with a clean harvester to avoid contamination of 
subsequent crop rotations) and sells the harvested 
crops in a single lot with the rest of his GM crops. In 
either version of System 2, the GM farmer has to 
compensate the neighboring non-GM farmer for the IP 
rent p foregone. In System b, there is a market price 
risk which can be borne by either the GM or the non-
GM farmer, depending on the contract between both 
parties. Moreover, the system introduces transaction 
costs due to moral hazard [e.g., see 28]. In System 2b, 
the GM farmer has incentives for underreporting 
yields of non-GM crops on his neighbor’s field. In 
System 1b, the GM farmer pays the non-GM farmer 
for his cultivation services, but since the latter is not 
the residual claimant of the barrier crops, he has 
incentives to lower the quality of his services. System 
a avoids these transaction costs, but introduces loss of 
scale economies. In System 1a, for example, the GM 
farmer has to manage two different weed management 
systems on his field and in System 2a, the non-GM 
farmer has to separately sell limited quantities of 
potentially contaminated non-GM crops to GM-
labeled outlets. The separate sale of contaminated non-
GM crops to the GM outlet could be checked through 
an invoice after the transaction has taken place; no 
over-reporting of yields would be possible. However, 
the non-GM farmer has incentives to exaggerate the 
pollen barrier area. Moreover, price differences 
between IP and GM crops as compensation premiums 
are easily confounded with price discounts for small 
GM crop lots. Finally, additional transaction costs may 
arise in collecting information, planning and 
negotiating coexistence measures among farmers. 
  We can reasonably assume that farmers will 
choose the system that minimizes total (opportunity, 
transaction and operational) costs in the long run. If, 
for example, System 1a turns out to be the most 
widely applied system despite GM rents superior to IP 
rents, this would suggest that transaction and 
operational costs are minimized under this system, i.e. 
the additional management costs owing to scale 
inefficiency are inferior to the transaction costs from 
farmer coordination. Therefore, the average 
coexistence costs, Cpb, borne by GM farmers per 
hectare of GM planting as a result of implementing a 
pollen barrier can be algebraically presented as 
follows: 
( ) ) 2 ( , , , , min b 2 s a 2 s b 1 s a 1 s pb t p t p t g t g C + + + + = α α α α
where αs is the shadow factor of pollen barriers, as the 
total shadow area, i.e. the total area under pollen 
barriers, ag the total area of GM plantings, and t1a, t1b, 
t2a and t2b the per-hectare transaction and operational 
costs for implementing System 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, 
respectively. Note that Cpb is also composed of a fixed 
and a variable part, the latter proportional to the pollen 
barrier area. 
  Equation 2 clearly illustrates that, according to our 
definition, the costs of flexible SEACERs are 
proportional to the incentives for coexistence as the 
function is weakly increasing in both incentives (GM 
and IP rent). If IP rents are negligible compared to GM 
rents, GM farmers will have incentives to propose 
System 2 to their neighboring farmers. They might 
even persuade the latter to convert their fields to GM. 
If IP rents rise, coexistence costs will rise 
proportionally until farmers switch to System 1 as 
System 2 becomes more expensive. Further rising IP 
rents will not affect coexistence costs under System 1 
and, therefore, the relationship is weakly and not 
strictly increasing in both incentives. However, GM 
farmers may be attracted by high IP rents and abandon 
GM crop production. This would raise the shadow 
factor, but the increase would be proportional to the 
high IP incentive. However, in the case of rigid 
SEACERs, Equation 1 shows that the costs are not 
weakly increasing in both incentives, but only in their 
trade-off. Application of the newcomer principle 
implies that the costs of rigid SEACERs are strictly 
increasing in the GM rent, but strictly decreasing in 
the IP rent. If IP rents decline, the costs of rigid 
SEACERs increase instead of decrease in the case of 
flexible SEACERs. While equations 1 and 2 respond 
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theoretically to the central question in this article, in 
the next sections we will analyze how the spatial 
configuration of the landscape may have an additional 
effect on the proportionality of alternative SEACERs. 
 
Fig. 1 GIS shapefile of the sample square in Selommes (Loir-et-
Cher). The figure represents a random draw of the benchmark 
scenario (crop planting density of 13% and GM adoption rate of 
50%). Arable fields are dotted, non-GM crop fields grey and GM 
crop fields black. 
III. SPATIAL MODELING FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we simulate the adoption of a 
theoretical GM crop in a real landscape in Central 
France to compare the shadow factors of rigid versus 
flexible SEACERs. We select a sample square of 
about 100 km² centered around a grain silo 
(Selommes, Beauce region, Loir-et-Cher), and conduct 
simulations through the software ArcView® on a GIS 
dataset of this sample square [29]. The Beauce region 
is famous for its cereals. This small region is almost 
exclusively devoted to farming; 75% of the land is 
occupied by agriculture and 80% of the farms are 
classified as producing ‘cereals and protein oil crops’, 
which is an exceptional proportion (44% in the Loir-
et-Cher region, 46% for the Centre region and 15% for 
France as a whole). 63% of the arable land is planted 
with cereals and 13% with oilseed rape, the latter 
however by 67% of the farmers [30]. We start from a 
GIS shapefile where the arable fields are represented 
as polygons (Figure 1). The sample square is less 
densely farmed (42%) than the regional average 
(75%). The modeled landscape counts 1,508 arable 
fields with an average field size of 2.8 ha and covering 
an area of 4,233 ha. This implies that the average field 
width is 168 m and the average distance between the 
fields amounts to 90 m. 
  We base our distance requirements for the 
SEACERs on the available literature evidence on two 
important European crops, i.e. oilseed rape and maize, 
where it is suggested that the extent of cross-
fertilization is reduced much more effectively by a 
pollen barrier than an isolation perimeter of bare 
ground of the same width [31]. In their study on 
pollen-mediated gene flow from HT oilseed rape, 
Damgaard and Kjellsson [11] observe that isolation 
distances of 50 m between GM and non-GM OSR 
fields should be sufficient to achieve a cross-
fertilization rate of 0.3%. In contrast, Hüsken and 
Dietz-Pfeilstetter [14] review 16 studies and conclude 
that 10 m pollen barriers achieve a similar rate of 
0.5%. Both rates largely fulfill the 0.9% threshold 
condition set by the EU labeling legislation and 
suggest that pollen barriers are more spatially efficient 
than isolation distances with regard to minimizing 
cross-pollination [32]. Comparable results are found 
for maize, where the effectiveness of 10-20 m pollen 
barriers, ideally planted around the recipient field [33-
37], is shown to be comparable to 50 m isolation 
distances of bare ground [10,12,13,15,34,38]. Sanvido 
et al.’s [15] recent meta-analysis of 13 studies 
concluded that an isolation perimeter of 50 m would 
be sufficient to keep cross-fertilization levels below 
the 0.5% at the border of the recipient maize field. 
Based on this empirical evidence and including a 
political safety factor, we model (i) flexible SEACERs 
by designing pollen barriers of 10-20 m on GM 
(System 1) or non-GM (System 2) field polygons, and 
(ii) rigid SEACERs by imposing 50-100 m isolation 
distances between GM and non-GM fields. Although 
the outer rows of a recipient field (System 2) tend to 
reduce cross-fertilization more efficiently than a 
pollen barrier of the same width around the donor 
(System 1), our flexible measures only concern 
neighboring fields. Therefore, a similar efficiency in 
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reducing cross-fertilization was assumed among both 
systems. 
  In the benchmark scenario, we consider a 
theoretical crop which is assumed to be planted at a 
planting density equal to the regional average of 13% 
for oilseed rape [30]. We furthermore assume a 
benchmark GM adoption rate of 50% (Figure 1). The 
latter assumption maximizes the probability of a GM 
field being close to a non-GM field. The benchmark 
scenario further assumes a pollen barrier width of 10 
m (flexible SEACERs) versus an isolation distance of 
50 m (rigid SEACERs). In addition to the benchmark 
scenario (scenario 1), we define six alternative 
scenarios (see Table 1 and Table 2) by varying (i) the 
adoption rate to 25% (scenario 2) and 75% (scenario 
3), (ii) the planting density to 6% (scenario 4) and 
26% (scenarios 5 and 7), and (iii) the distance 
requirements to 20 m (flexible SEACERs) and 100 m 
(rigid SEACERs) (scenarios 6 and 7). A well-known 
fact in spatial analysis is the nonlinear relationship 
between field counts and field areas, due to unequal 
field sizes in the landscape. Since crops can be easier 
attributed to fields, we develop a constrained 
randomization procedure to allocate GM and non-GM 
crops in the landscape, independently of farmers’ land 
tenure. We introduce planting densities and GM crop 
adoption rates from our scenario assumptions into a 
random function which randomly allocates GM and 
non-GM crops in the landscape. We repeat the random 
function until we find 10 allocations per scenario 
which satisfy the planting density assumptions with a 
precision of 1%. Our constrained randomization 
procedure yields 50 independent random crop 
allocations (scenarios 1 and 6 and scenarios 5 and 7 
share a single set of 10 allocations as they are based on 
the same planting assumptions). We furthermore 
assume that farmers plant the fields with pure seeds, 
i.e. free from GM contamination, and comply with the 
proposed SEACERs to minimize cross-fertilization. 
We finally model the alternative SEACERs in 
ArcView® defined by the scenarios for all 50 crop 
allocations and calculate the means of the total GM, 
non-GM and shadow area. We observed that the 
standard errors (SE) of the outcomes (Table 1 and 
Table 2) were satisfactory low after 10 random draws. 
IV. RESULTS  
In Table 1, we report the average area proportions 
generated by imposing rigid SEACERs on our random 
crop allocations. Differences in average crop areas, 
despite similar planting assumptions, are due to the 
precision of the constrained randomization procedure 
which has been set at the planting density level at 1% 
(e.g., 12.5% = 12.6% = … = 13.4% = 13%). The low 
standard errors (SE) of the shadow factors in the last 
column suggest that our constrained randomization 
procedure causes the Monte Carlo simulation to 
converge rapidly and to produce robust estimates after 
only 10 random draws. The ‘Phase 1’ rows report the 
initial GM-free areas and shadow factors generated by 
imposing rigid SEACERs in a landscape with GM and 
non-GM farmers. Initial shadow factors vary from 
0.18 to 0.66, suggesting that the spatial configuration 
of the landscape is such that the average coexistence 
costs per hectare of GM plantings amount to 18-66% 
of the market opportunity costs per unit of shadow 
area. This suggests that farmers can sufficiently 
amortize the opportunity costs over their GM area. 
  However, these estimates are not stable; if farmers 
convert their GM planting decisions to non-GM in 
response to rigid SEACERs, a domino-effect of 
planting decision conversions may occur [7,27]. The 
domino-effect is the theoretical spillover effect of 
farmer decisions induced by enforcing rigid 
coexistence regulations on potential GM crop 
adopters. In the absence of any regulation, GM and 
non-GM planting options would coexist in a 
population of farmers. Through compliance with 
isolation distances, some potential GM crop adopters 
will have to modify their planting decisions (i.e. from 
GM to non-GM varieties) and will attempt to capture 
IP gains by complying with IP standards. These new 
IP farmers might, in turn, restrict planting options and 
convert planting decisions of neighboring GM farmers 
(Phase 2). Subsequently, this might affect other GM 
farmers’ planting options and impinge on planting 
decisions, etc. (Phase 3-4), until all distance 
requirements between GM and non-GM fields are met 
at the landscape level. The ‘Phase 2-4’ rows in Table 1 
report the cumulative influence of the domino-effect 
on the number and area of GM-free fields and the 
shadow factor. Depending on the scenario, the 
domino-effect expands the initial shadow area in 
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na ios. All estimates are averages, based on 10 random 
e crop areas among scenarios with equal plantings are due to the 




Phase 1 with 2-41% and reduces adoption with 19-
77% until only small clusters of GM crop plantings 
remain. While the static relationship between the 
proportion of land available for GM crops and the 
isolation distance (e.g., in ‘Phase 1’ rows of Table 1) 
has been recognized in scholarly research on 
coexistence [18,39], the theoretical possibility of the 
domino-effect on adoption intentions has been largely 
ignored [7,27].   
Table 1 Average shadow factors of rigid SEACERs under alter tive scenar
allocations of GM and non-GM crop fields. Differences in averag
precision of the constrained randomization procedure which has been se
ses the relative difference in per cent between the cumulative value in Phase 4 and the value in Phase 1. The shadow factor is 
ratio of GM-free to GM area. Source: Authors’ calculations based on GIS dataset of the sample square [29]. 
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0.47 ± 0.05 
0.50 ± 0.05  Phase 3 










33  91  0.50 ±  05 
0.73 ± 0.10 
0.
Domino 
enario 2          
Phase 1  547  13%  137  25%  50  23  67  0.49 ± 0.04 
Phase 2  547  13%  70  13%  50  25  70  1.12 ± 0.18 
Phase 3  7    67  12%  25  71  1.18 ± 0.18 










25  71  1.20 ±  18 




enario 3          
Phase 1  546  13%  410  75%  50  22  77  0.19 ± 0.03 
Phase 2  546  13%  333  61%  50  28  102  0.33 ± 0.06 
Phase 3
Phase 4 











30  06  0.39 ±  08 




enario 4          
Phase 1  262  6%  131  50%  50  9  24  0.18 ± 0.03 
Phase 2  262  6%  107  41%  50  9  24  0.24 ± 0.05 
Phase 3
Phase 4 











9  24  0.24 ±  05 




enario 5          
Phase 1  1,097  26%  548  50%  50  90  310  0.57 ± 0.03 
Phase 2  1,097  26%  238  22%  50  105 
107 
357  1.57 ± 0.14 
Phase 3  7   191  17%  362  2.00 ± 0.18 










08  362  2.05 ±  17 




enario 6          
Phase 1  559  13%  280  50%  100  37  97  0.35 ± 0.03 
Phase 2  559  13%  182  33%  100  43  117  0.67 ± 0.07 
Phase 3  9    162  29%  0  44  119  0.78 ± 0.09 










0  44  19  0.78 ±  09 




enario 7          
Phase 1  1,097  26%  548  50%  100  112  361  0.66 ± 0.02 
Phase 2  1,097  26%  187  17%  100  130  411  2.31 ± 0.18 
Phase 3  7   136  12%  0  133  419  3.27 ± 0.27 










0  133  420  3.45 ±  26 
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In chma o, characterized   planting
density of 13% a GM  ion rate 0%, the
initial shadow factor amounts to 0.29 and nearl
 than doubles the initial 
hadow f r (0.35), which is mo




en  y at 1%. The shadow factor is 
the ratio of pollen barrier to GM area. Source: Authors’ calculations based on GIS dataset of the sample square [29]. 
Sc. E 
 the ben rk scenari by a   benchmark scenario, less
 and  adopt  of 5   s
y  a
triples to 0.73 as a result of the domino-effect on the 
GM-free area (+16%) and on the GM area (-33%). 
Scenario 2 yields a higher initial shadow factor (0.49) 
as the shadow area is amortized over a smaller initial 
GM area (25% adoption), which is further eroded by  
the domino-effect (-52%). However, owing to the 
lower density of GM fields in the landscape, the 
domino-effect on shadow area is modest (+9%) and 
nearly triples the initial shadow factor (1.36). Scenario 
3 generates a lower initial shadow factor (0.19) as the 
shadow area is amortized over a greater GM area 
(75% adoption), but the high GM field density entails 
the most prominent domino-effect on the shadow area 
(+41%) among all scenarios, boosting the shadow 
factor to its five-fold (0.96). Scenario 4, on the other 
hand, yields the lowest shadow factor (0.27) and the 
smallest domino-effect on the shadow area (+2%) due 
to its assumed low crop planting density of 6%, which 
is comparable to oilseed rape planting in the Fife 
region of Scotland [40]. The initial shadow factor 
(0.57) in scenario 5 looks similar to scenario 2, but the 
increased planting density (26%) generates an 
important domino-effect on the shadow area (+18%) 
and the GM area (-66%), which raises the shadow 
factor to nearly its five-fold (2.56). A similar but less 
dramatic effect is obtained by doubling the isolation 
distance (100 m) in scenario 6, which, compared to the 
(+22%) and the GM area (-42%). Finally, combining a 
large isolation distance with a high planting density in 
scenario 7 leads to the highest shadow factor (4.20), 
i.e. a six-fold increase from the initial shadow factor 
(0.66), as a result of an average domino-effect on the 
shadow area (+17%), but a large-scale domino-effect 
on the GM area (-77%). 
  These findings suggest that the domino-effect 
exacerbates the non-proportionality of rigid SEACERs 
through its multiplicator effect on shadow factors, i.e. 
 i
Table 2 Average shadow factors of flexible SEACERs under alte
allocations of GM and non-GM crop fields. Differences in avera
precision of the constrained randomization procedure which has be
acto re than tripled (1.19) 
on the o mino- adow area 
by ncreasing the shadow area and driving GM crop 
production out of the landscape. Only if IP rents are 
competitive to GM rents are the costs of rigid 
SEACERs minimized (equation 1) as farmers become 
indifferent between supplying GM and IP crops. If IP 
rents decline, however, the costs of rigid SEACERs 
increase (equation 1) instead of decrease in the case of 
flexible SEACERs (equation 2) and this effect is 
exacerbated by the domino-effect. If IP rents become 
negligible, shadow factors need to be less than one in 
order to allow farmers to profitably adopt GM crops 
and comply with rigid SEACERs. Table 1 shows that 
in our landscape sample this condition is only met 
under low-medium planting densities (6-13%) with 
medium-high adoption rates (50-75%) subject to small 
(50 m) isolation distances (scenarios 1, 3, and 4). 
ative scenarios. All estimates are averages, based on 10 random 
 crop areas among scenarios with equal plantings are due to the 
set at the level of the planting densit
  Crop area (ha)  Planting density  GM area (ha)  Adoption  Pollen barrier (m)  Pollen barrier area (ha)  Shadow factor ± S
1  559  13%  280  50%  10  1.8  0.006 ± 0.000 
2 
3   0.000 
547  13%  137  25%  10  1.9  0.014 ± 0.001 
546  13%  410  75%  10  1.6  0.004 ±
4  262  6%  131  50%  10  0.6  0.004 ± 0.001 
5  1,097  26%  548  50%  10  8.2  0.015 ± 0.001 
6  559  13%  280  50%  20  4.7  0.017 ± 0.001 
7  1,097  26%  548  50%  20  21.8  0.040 ± 0.002 
Pollen b , on the   hand, yi ubstan
aller shadow factors owing to their higher spatial 
fective n reducin oss-fertiliz n [31]. Our 
rates (75%) to its t ld of 0.0 a 
comb of high plan  densities (2  
adopt rates (50%) an ge distance ts 
arriers other eld s tially 
sm
ef ness i g cr atio
estimated shadow factors range from a value of 0.004 
under low planting densities (6%) or high adoption 
(20 m) (Table 2). Doubling the planting density from 
13% to 26% more than doubles the shadow factor, i.e. 
en-fo 40 under 
ination  ting 6%), medium
ion  d lar  requiremen
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from 0.006 in the benchmark scenario to 0.015 in 
scenario 5. This is equivalent to doubling the distance 
requirement from 10 m to 20 m, which yields a similar 
shadow factor of 0.017 in scenario 6. These shadow 
factors need to be multiplied by the relevant market 
opportunity costs to obtain average opportunity costs, 
but our examples have shown that flexible SEACERs 
can be designed in such a way that they encourage 
farmers to minimize total (opportunity, transaction and 
operational) coexistence costs and satisfy the 
proportionality condition (equation 2), in contrast with 
rigid SEACERs (equation 1). 
  Our framework is subject to strengths and 
limitations. Its major strength is probably its 
simplicity; its major limitation is related to data 
requirements. GIS datasets are difficult to obtain due 
to their proprietary nature and rarely contain a 
complete set of spatially linked information on land 
tenure, farmer practices, intentions and strategies of 
e implemented through a less 
 Therefore, our 
coordination, production costs, etc.. This data gap has 
forced us to make simplifying assumptions and the 
most important one is the assumption of homogeneity 
of GM and IP rents, which introduces homogeneity 
bias into our shadow factor estimates. In the literature 
on GM crops, it is widely accepted that GM rents 
captured by farmers are heterogeneous, as they operate 
under heterogeneous conditions with respect to land 
quality, pest pressure, managerial expertise, education 
and market access [3,41-43]. Although IP price 
premiums are more or less homogenous among 
farmers as they are generated by the interaction of 
aggregate demand and supply (i.e. market share) on a 
differentiated market for GM and IP crops, IP rents are 
more heterogeneous as they also depend on 
heterogeneous yield levels. Since we were interested 
in the average spatial impact of alternative SEACERs 
in this article, we empirically interpreted coexistence 
costs in equations 1 and 2 as sample area averages in 
order to reduce variability. However, they can be 
alternatively interpreted as stochastic at the field level. 
If field-level data can be obtained on shadow areas, 
homogeneity bias can be removed and owing to 
Jensen’s inequality [44], the mean of the field-level 
shadow factors will be different from the mean of the 
sample-level shadow factors we reported in Table 1 
and Table 2. Moreover, if field-level shadow factors 
can be weighted with field-level data on GM and IP 
rents, the statistical distribution of field-level 
coexistence costs can be estimated, which can be used 
to further refine impact assessments and policy 
recommendations. 
  Related limitations are our assumptions that all 
farmers operating under rigid SEACERs will convert 
their entire GM field to GM-free, and that all those 
operating under flexible SEACERs will implement 
pollen barriers. We made this assumption for the 
benefit of simplicity and to ensure the polarization 
between rigid and flexible SEACERs. An isolation 
distance could b
expensive pollen barrier in the case of rigid 
SEACERs, but an expensive pollen barrier can be 
perceived as an isolation distance in the case of 
flexible SEACERs. The question comes down to an 
additional assumption of threshold, which defines (i) 
in the case of flexible SEACERs, how large the share 
of the pollen barrier area in the field may be before it 
is perceived and implemented as an isolation distance 
and, (ii) in the case of rigid SEACERs how small the 
share of the GM-free area in the field has to be before 
the isolation distance is implemented through a pollen 
barrier. Hence, in these border cases we underestimate 
the costs of flexible SEACERs, as on some fields 
farmers would abandon GM production right away, 
and overestimate the costs of rigid regulations, as on 
some fields farmers would comply with isolation 
distances through pollen barriers. By not introducing 
this threshold parameter in our framework, we 
implicitly set it equal to zero and polarize the two 
alternative SEACERs, knowing that for some farmers, 
the distinction between both alternative SEACERs 
may be less pronounced. In any case, the threshold 
parameter would not affect our qualitative findings 
about the proportionality condition. 
  Another limitation of our framework is the fact 
that the GIS database of our sample area does not 
contain land tenure records, which forced us to treat 
all fields as independent. Randomly assigning GM and 
non-GM crop fields among these fields, subject to a 
set of planting constraints, also generates on-farm 
inter-field coexistence situations, which are generally 
not classified under coexistence.
assumption of independent fields probably biases 
shadow areas and factors upwards. However, despite 
the fact that land tenure is relatively scattered in the 
12
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analysed region [30], we expect that minimization of 
coexistence costs will drive clustering of farms in the 
medium and long-run [17,39]. As a result, our 
overestimation originates both from the independence 
assumption and from the constrained randomization 
procedure. Therefore, our shadow factor estimates 
have to be interpreted as upper values of the expected 
medium and long-run values. 
  A further limitation of our proposed framework is 
the fact that our shadow factors are based on a single 
landscape. In order to relax this limitation and widen 
somewhat the range of landscape configurations 
captured by our framework, we varied planting 
densities from 6%, i.e. comparable to oilseed rape 
planting in the Fife region of Scotland [40], to its 
fourfold of 26%. However, this variation still failed to 
coexistence [24]. By analyzing a single season, our 
 
o
 designed based on a meta-
capture alternative degrees of land fragmentation as 
planting density does not affect the average field size 
in our sample. Therefore, research efforts need to be 
done in order to reproduce our spatial methodology for 
different landscape configurations. The constrained 
randomization procedure dramatically increased the 
convergence rate of the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Nevertheless, modeling in ArcView® remains 
extremely time-consuming, and future research needs 
to automate the entire procedure in a single software 
module to enable rapid calculations. Another solution 
could be to summarize landscape configuration in a 
single measure such as the concept of the land 
fragmentation index. In the literature, different indices 
of land fragmentation have been proposed, e.g. based 
on the number and size of plots, between-plot 
distances, and combining size and shape [45]. Future 
research could provide a useful and innovative 
contribution by mathematically deriving our shadow 
factor as a function of an index of land fragmentation. 
This will enable efficiently reproducing our 
framework for a variety of European landscapes and 
will provide valuable information for policy makers on 
the compared spatial impact of alternative SEACERs. 
  An additional issue which is not captured in our 
framework is the important issue of irreversibility, a 
weakness which our framework shares with Munro’s 
[26] model. The issue of irreversibility has been 
widely applied on regulatory approval and adoption of 
GM crops [46], but less frequently on the regulation of 
framework implicitly relies on the compliance and 
effectiveness assumptions, which suppose that the
m deled SEACERs are sufficient for maintaining seed 
purity and limiting the development of volunteers over 
time. In the case of oilseed rape, this is a strong 
assumption which implicitly ignores additional costs 
due to management complications over time. Messéan 
et al. [47] show that over time the rate of GM seeds 
admixture in the harvest largely exceeded the 
European threshold in 6 out of 18 cases and conclude 
that “Unless appropriate management and agronomical 
guidelines to manage volunteers are implemented, it 
will indeed be hazardous for a farmer to go back to a 
conventional non-GM farming system, even 5 years 
after the last transgenic OSR harvest” (p. 121). 
Moreover, oilseed rape has a number of cross-
compatible wild and weedy relatives which increases 
the possibilities for the establishment of a feral 
population of the crop. In contrast, maize has no cross-
compatible wild/weedy relatives in the European 
Union [8], whilst wheat have some potential partners 
[48]. Hence, while our framework focused only on the 
spatial dimension, future research on coexistence will 
need to assess the impact of alternative SEACERs in 
the temporal dimension. It may well be that for some 
crops inclusion of time will argue for more 
conservative SEACERs. 
  Another data constraint is related to the ex ante 
nature of the coexistence question in Europe, which 
inspired us to split the problem into two parts and 
focus on the spatial component, while exogeneizing 
the market component. As long as the EU has limited 
experience with a differentiated market of GM and IP 
crops, policy makers can use the concept of the 
shadow factor as a proxy variable for opportunity 
costs. SEACERs can be
analysis of distance requirements from cross-
fertilization studies. Once policy makers have 
established a set of shadow factors for a variety of 
landscapes, they can easily compare the regional 
impact of alternative SEACERs through a single 
measure. GM rents, although heterogeneous, have 
been more or less established after a decade of global 
GM crop adoption [49]. The literature reports GM rent 
estimates for maize ranging from €23/ha in Hungary 
and €31/ha in the Czech Republic [41] to €47/ha in 
Spain [50] and €70/ha in France [51], while estimates 
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for oilseed rape range from €29/ha in Hungary to €55-
56/ha in the Czech Republic and France [27,41].  
  Future IP rents, on the other hand, are still 
uncertain in the EU, owing to limited experience with 
the large-scale diffusion of GM crops. However, they 
can be approximated through analogy in comparable 
import markets (e.g., soybeans in the EU), or not 
approximated at all and replaced by break-even values 
(e.g., equal to GM rents), as illustrated by Demont et 
al. [27]. Break-even assumptions are widely used 
strategies in ex ante impact assessment for assuming 
at they are both complied with and 
the spatial configuration of a particular 
we defined as the rents derived from cultivating GM 
crops (GM rents) and preserving the identity of non-
GM crops (IP rents). We developed a spatial 
away and avoiding imposing strong prior assumptions 
on unknown or highly uncertain parameters [46] or for 
sharpening a model’s prediction on potential 
quantitative results [5]. To date, price differentials for 
GM-free crops have been weak in international 
agricultural markets [52,53]. This does not imply that, 
under weak market signals for IP crops, the entire 
European landscape will be planted with GM crops 
and crowd out IP crop production. Experience has 
shown that GM crop adoption is usually incomplete. 
Proprietary GM seed technologies are protected by 
intellectual property rights (i.e. patents) that confer 
monopoly rights to the discoverer – with some 
limitations. As a result, GM seed prices are higher 
than they would be in a perfectly competitive market, 
despite competition from chemical alternatives. If 
biotechnology companies set the GM seed price at a 
uniform, monopolistic level among a heterogeneous 
group of farmers, some farmers would find it 
profitable to adopt the innovation, while others would 
not. Other reasons for incomplete adoption include 
farmers’ uncertainty about anticipated GM gains, and 
risk aversion towards new technologies, a well-known 
phenomenon in the literature on agricultural 
innovation. 
  The latter leads us to a limitation of our three basic 
assumptions (compliance, effectiveness, and the 
newcomer principle), which excludes the possibility of 
consumers with strong preferences for IP crops being 
prevented from having access to IP crops as a result of 
cross-fertilization due to under-regulation of 
coexistence. Indeed, in this paper we argue that 
flexible SEACERs are preferable to rigid SEACERs, 
assuming th
effective, and therefore, based on the literature, we 
compared small pollen barriers with large isolation 
distances. Hence, if these distance requirements were 
to be insufficient, coexistence would be under-
regulated and this would engender important welfare 
losses for consumers of IP crops. However, over-
regulation could entail similar welfare losses. From 
Table 1 we would tend to conclude that rigid 
SEACERs protect and favor IP crop farmers and 
consumers and harm GM crop farmers. However, if 
consumer preferences for IP crops are not competitive 
to farmer preferences for GM crops, i.e. if they 
generate smaller IP incentives than GM incentives for 
farmers, an inverse domino-effect could occur 
triggered by GM farmers who try to convince their 
non-GM neighbors to revisit their planting decisions. 
It is possible that both types of domino-effect will 
coexist and complement regional specialization in the 
European landscape and that highly productive areas, 
in which the incentive for growing GM crops is higher 
than the incentive for supplying IP crops, will cluster 
as GM regions, whereas low productive areas will 
rapidly form ‘GMO-free’ zones [17,39] in an attempt 
to capture the IP rents. 
  Finally, it is important to draw the reader’s 
attention to the fact that our proposed distance 
requirement assumptions are illustrative in any case. 
They have been borrowed from literature evidence on 
cross-fertilization from available case studies of 
oilseed rape and maize, but policy makers may double 
or triple these distance requirements in order to 
include a political safety factor. These benchmark 
assumptions nevertheless provided useful information 
on how 
landscape affects the proportionality of alternative 
SEACERs, which is the central question in this article.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In its struggle to implement coherent coexistence 
regulations on GM and non-GM crops in all member 
states, the EU has clearly emphasized that any 
approach needs to be proportionate to the aim of 
achieving coexistence. We defined the proportionality 
condition as a functional relationship which is weakly 
increasing in both incentives for coexistence, which 
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framew portionality of 
alternative spatial ex ante
(S
egulations, an issue which is currently 
e and therefore, we hope 
1.  EC (2003)  on of 23 July 
2003 on g  of national 
tence of genetically modified 
crops with conventional and organic farming. 
Commission of t unities, Brussels 
3.  Lapan HE, Mos novation and trade 
with endogenous market failure: The case of 
. European Communities, 
i-
ultural Economics 19:97-109 
ork for analyzing the pro
 coexistence regulations 
EACERs) based on a geographic model of a real 
landscape in Central France. We introduced the novel 
concept of shadow factor as a measure for farmers’ 
opportunity costs of complying with SEACERs in a 
given landscape. Our empirical findings suggest that 
rigid SEACERs which are based on large isolation 
distances imposed on GM farmers violate the 
proportionality condition and, hence, are not 
consistent with the objectives of the EU. Our findings 
argue for incorporating a certain degree of flexibility 
into SEACERs by advising pollen barrier agreements 
between farmers rather than imposing rigid isolation 
distances on GM farmers, since the shadow factors of 
pollen barriers are proportional to the incentives for 
coexistence. 
  The empirical questions of proportionality and 
flexibility have been largely ignored in the literature 
on coexistence and provide timely information for EU 
policy makers. Authorities may be reluctant to adopt 
flexible ex ante regulations, but in the absence of clear 
market signals for IP crops, regulatory rigidity should 
be shifted from ex ante to ex post to avoid 
jeopardizing the economic incentives for coexistence 
in EU agriculture [7]. Germany for example – perhaps 
inspired by their advisory speed limits in traffic law – 
is currently planning to introduce flexibility into its 
coexistence r
highly debated among politicians and interest groups 
[54]. German traffic law also shifts regulatory rigidity 
from ex ante to ex post. In case of a road accident, the 
driver can be held ex post liable for negligence if he 
did not comply with the ex ante speed limit during the 
accident [55]. The same model could be applied in 
coexistence regulation; if any incident of GM 
contamination occurs and affects the welfare of 
farmers and consumers, GM farmers are held ex post 
liable for negligence and have to pay ex post tort 
liability costs if they did not comply with the ex ante 
coexistence regulations [24]. 
  Finally, coexistence of agricultural production 
systems is a complex research subject and our 
proposed framework is just a small building stone in 
an emerging field of economic and policy research on 
coexistence which still largely needs to be developed. 
Further research is needed to forecast the market 
response to the introduction of GM crops in Europe 
and to link our framework to a generalized index of 
land fragmentation. However, the major weakness of 
the framework remains due to the ex ante nature of the 
coexistence problem in Europ
that it may inspire other researchers to go further and 
obtain the relevant data to analyze the problem in its 
entirety. 
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